Certificate Transparency
ENTERPRISE This is an EJBCA Enterprise feature.
Certificate Transparency (CT) is an Internet security framework for monitoring and auditing digital certificates. The following sections cover how to set up and configure Certificate Transparency logging for a CA.
For general information about Certificate Transparency in EJBCA, see Certificate Transparency Overview.
Usage
Your EJBCA installation needs the EJBCA Enterprise Edition only ct module. Depending on the CT modes you require, there are some extra preparations.
Using CT in Certificates
Configure the logs and enable CT in the certificate profiles as described in the section Adding CT Logs.
It is recommended to add a Pre-Certificate Revocation Service to revoke any incompletely issued certificates, i.e. pre-certificates for which the final certificate was not generated. If no such service exists, a button to add the service will appear in the System Configuration Certificate Transparency Logs tab.
Using CT in OCSP Responses
EJBCA supports CT in OCSP responses, both in live OCSP responders and for pre-production of responses. By default, EJBCA will cache up to approximately 100 000 CT response extensions in memory. Excess cached response extensions that have not been requested for 10 seconds are randomly evicted from the cache. The parameters can be adjusted in the file conf/cesecore.properties
.
To use CT OCSP you must also enable the corresponding extension in the OcspKeyBinding of the OCSP Responder:
- Select CA UI → Internal Key Bindings → OcspKeyBindings and choose the Key Binding to edit.
- Under OCSP Extensions, select Certificate Transparency SCT.
- Click Add and then click Save.
For more information on configuring CT logs and certificate profiles, see Adding CT Logs.
Using CT for TLS Extension
In this mode, the certificate holder requests SCTs from the logs and includes them in a TLS extension. The CA is not required to do anything, but it is possible to reduce the time it takes until full (merged) audit log records are available by publishing certificates to the logs as soon as they are issued. For configuration details, see Publish to CT Logs Asynchronously after Issuance.
Publish to CT Logs Asynchronously after Issuance
EJBCA can asynchronously publish certificates to one or more CT logs, using a Custom Publisher. This feature is intended to be used mainly when using CT in TLS mode or OCSP mode.
To enable publishing to logs without including the SCTs in issued certificates, do the following:
Go to CA Functions > Publishers and add a new publisher with the following configuration:
Field
Value
Publisher Type
Custom Publisher.
Class Path org.ejbca.code.model.ca.publisher.CTCustomPublisher
Depending on the system configuration, this may show as "CTCustomPublisher" only.
Properties
Leave blank.
No direct publishing, only use queue
Yes.
Keep successfully published items in database
No.
Use queue for CRLs
No.
Use queue for certificates
Yes.
Click Save.
Note that the publisher has to be enabled in the certificate profiles before publishing becomes active.Next, specify the following under System Functions > Services to create a service for the publisher:
Field
Description
Worker
Publisher Queue Process Worker.
Publishers to check
The previously created publisher.
Period
Default is 5 minutes and can be changed to several hours.
Active
Yes.
Management
Pre-Certificate Revocation Service
When using CT in certificates, it is recommended to add a Pre-Certificate Revocation Service. If only using CT in OCSP responses or TLS extensions, no such service is needed.
Adding CT Logs
CT log servers are configured under System Configuration. Note that the CT log servers will not be active until enabled per certificate profile.
The following parameters have to be configured in a log:
Field | Value |
---|---|
Log URL | The log URL, for example https://ct.googleapis.com/testtube/. |
Public Key | The log's public key, in raw base64, PEM or DER/CRT format. Usually, this is an Elliptic Curve key. |
Timeout | Connection timeout in milliseconds, default 5 seconds. Note that certificate issuance and/or OCSP response generation must wait for the log server to respond, so do not set it too high. Note that zero is not a valid value for the timeout. |
Label | Specify which label to place the log under. See CT Log Labels. |
The log server needs to accept certificates issued by your CAs. For local testing, you can install your own instance of the sample log server from the CT open source project, and add your root CA to the list of trusted CAs. For a production system (or testing of one), you must contact the log operator to have your root CA added.
For redundancy, it is recommended to add more logs to each label than the minimum required. That way certificate issuance will not fail if a single log is down. It is also a good idea to specify a short timeout value and/or enable the ct.fastfail.enabled option in conf/cesecore.properties
, so a failing log does not slow down all requests.
Regarding performance, EJBCA will connect to every log having one of the labels selected in the certificate profile, in the order they have been added and in parallel. It will keep fetching SCTs until Maximum number of SCTs is reached. EJBCA will fail issuance if it is unable to fetch at least the number of SCTs given by the parameter Minimum number of SCTs specified in the certificate profile. If the number of retrieved SCTs exceeds the max value, the log(s) last in order will be excluded.
To change the order in which the logs are contacted, reorganize the logs on the System Configuration page.
Sharded CT Logs
As part of the Google CT policy requirements for April 2018, some logs will only accept certificates expiring within a specific year.
To configure an expiration year, click Edit for the log after adding it. When configured, EJBCA will only submit to this log if the certificate expires within the year specified for the log.
It is also possible to configure an expiration period, to only submit certificates expiring within a defined expiry interval to the log. To configure a period, click Edit for an existing log, select Only publish certificates that expire this period, and specify the dates for the expiry interval.
Labels
It may be a requirement to publish to certain logs and a certain number of logs before issuing a certificate. For example, Google Chrome requires that all EV certificates issued after 1st of January 2015 must be published to at least one CT log operated by Google, at least one log not operated by Google, and to a certain number of logs in total, where the total amount of logs depends on the lifetime of the certificate.
In order to give some amount of control over which logs are written to during an issuance operation, logs are sorted in under Labels. By adding labels to certificate profiles, at least one log from each label must be written to. The remaining required SCTs will be used from the quickest logs to respond, and any SCTs returned after issuance will be discarded, in what is called the shotgun-approach, with the purpose to comply with Chrome requirements while still providing issuance in the shortest time possible.
The parameters Minimum number of SCTs and Maximum number of SCTs can be configured for each certificate profile, either manually or by certificate validity according to CT policy. An example setup complying to Chrome's CT policy could contain the following:
- A Google logs label containing a set of logs operated by Google, and a label Unlabeled containing a set of logs not operated by Google.
- A certificate profile with:
- The labels Google logs and Unlabeled selected.
- The parameter Minimum number of SCTs set to By validity to let EJBCA select a minimum dynamically based on Chrome's CT Policy.
- The parameter Maximum number of SCTs set to By validity to only include the number of SCT's required based on Chrome's CT Policy in the certificate.
Using Outgoing Proxy Server to Send to CT Logs
For security reasons, a common request is using an outgoing proxy server from the CA to the CT logs. The CT log function uses the Java/JBoss proxy configurations and the proxy properties in JBoss can be configured in one of the following ways:
- In standalone.sh append to JAVA_OPTS:
-Dhttp.proxyHost=HostName/IPaddress
-Dhttp.proxyPort=PortNumber
-Dhttps.proxyHost=HostName/IPaddress
-Dhttps.proxyPort=PortNumber
- In standalone.xml append to system-properties:
<property name="http.proxyHost" value="HostName/IPaddress"/>
<property name="http.proxyPort" value="PortNumber"/>
<property name="https.proxyHost" value="HostName/IPaddress"/>
<property name="https.proxyPort" value="PortNumber"/>
Ensure to reconfigure the proxy settings if you upgrade/change the JBoss instance.
Troubleshooting
Problems submitting to CT logs may be caused by a number of reasons. You may still be able to issue the certificate even if you experience issues, since EJBCA may be able to retrieve SCTs from any other logs you have configured.
TLS Session Reuse
When contacting a CT log, an HTTP POST request with a JSON payload containing the certificate chain is sent. This payload is typically about 4-6 kB large. Note that EJBCA as of version 6.11 supports TLS session reuse, allowing multiple certificate chains to be submitted over the same TLS session. Consequently, if you inspect the traffic sent between EJBCA and the CT log server you may note that the packets are substantially larger than expected. This is the expected behavior.
Connection reset
This symptom is diagnosed using log entries with "Connection reset" when submitting a certificate to CT logs as shown below:
Error making POST request to https://<log server>/ct/v1/add-pre-chain: Connection reset: java.util.concurrent.ExecutionException
To troubleshoot this issue, check the following:
Some log servers require TLS v1.2 which is not supported by some older versions of Java. Java 8 uses TLS v1.2 by default. If the CT submission failed because of a TLS error, you will see something like this in the log:
Caused by: java.net.SocketException: Connection reset at java.net.SocketInputStream.read(SocketInputStream.java:196) [rt.jar:1.7.0_85] at java.net.SocketInputStream.read(SocketInputStream.java:122) [rt.jar:1.7.0_85] at sun.security.ssl.InputRecord.readFully(InputRecord.java:442) [jsse.jar:1.7.0_85] at sun.security.ssl.InputRecord.read(InputRecord.java:480) [jsse.jar:1.7.0_85] at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.readRecord(SSLSocketImpl.java:946) [jsse.jar:1.7.0_85] at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.performInitialHandshake(SSLSocketImpl.java:1344) [jsse.jar:1.7.0_85] at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.startHandshake(SSLSocketImpl.java:1371) [jsse.jar:1.7.0_85] at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.startHandshake(SSLSocketImpl.java:1355) [jsse.jar:1.7.0_85]
CODEThis means the TLS handshake failed and the CT log server closed the connection.
Make sure your firewall is configured properly, e.g. allows EJBCA to send HTTPS traffic to the CT logs you are using.
To test the communication between EJBCA and the CT log server, issue the following command on the EJBCA machine:
> curl 'https://<log server>/ct/v1/add-pre-chain' { "error_message": "Unable to parse request.", "success": false }
BASH"Unable to parse request" means that the CT log server received your request successfully and the communication between EJBCA and the CT log server should work correctly.
HTTP 400 Bad Request
This symptom is diagnosed using log entries with "HTTP 400 Bad Request" when submitting a certificate to CT logs as shown below:
Unhandled exception when retrieving SCT for 'primekey.com' from CT log https://<log server>/ct/v1/. Error: org.certificatetransparency.ctlog.comm.LogCommunicationException:
Error making POST request to https://<log server>/ct/v1/add-pre-chain: HTTP 400 Bad Request: java.util.concurrent.ExecutionException
To troubleshoot this issue, check the following:
Make sure your root CA certificate is added to the CT log's truststore by the CT log operator.
To check which roots are accepted by a CT log, send a GET request to https://<log server>/ct/v1/get-roots as explained in RFC 6962, section 4.7 Retrieve Accepted Root Certificates. For more information, refer to RFC 6962.
All certificates are not accepted by all logs. In particular, some CT logs like Google's Argon logs and Cloudflare's Nimbus logs only accept certificates with a certain year for the output. When you add these logs, you should always enable the option for sharded CT logs as explained in Expiration Time Based CT Logs. If you are unsure which certificates a particular log accepts, contact the CT log operator.
Inspect the logs and look for the JSON error message returned from the CT log server. This message is logged at INFO level as of EJBCA 6.14 and looks something like the following example:
2018-06-01 13:37:00,000 INFO [org.cesecore.certificates.certificatetransparency.HttpPostTimeoutInvoker] (pool-30-thread-3) Error content from CT log was: { "error_message": "Foo.", "success": false }
CODEThe log entry will only be written to the log if you receive an HTTP response from the CT log with an HTTP status code x, 200 ≤ x ≤ 299. That is, if the CT submission failed due to a TLS error, this message will not be written to the log.
CT log servers have built-in rate-limiting. Some rate-limiters are global and may affect you even if your submission rate is low. CT issues caused by rate-limiting can be hard to troubleshoot since errors appear sporadically and seemingly at random. If the error message from the log server contains something like "invalid request" or "rate limit" you may be a victim of rate-limiting. To make sure EJBCA can issue the certificate even if some of the CT logs are unable to fulfill your request, you should add additional log servers to your CT log configuration.
Persisting Precertificates and OCSP
EJBCA generates a precertificate (RFC 6962) which is submitted to the configured CT logs before issuance of the final certificate. If (and only if) a sufficient number of SCTs are received in response, the final certificate is issued. In the event of not generating the final certificate due to insufficient SCT responses, failure to contact enough CT logs or any internal error after a precertificate has been generated, the transaction will be rolled back but the precertificate will be persisted in the database (as of EJBCA 7.3.1), and published to configured publishers.
Even though the precertificate itself is useless after a failed issuance, it is according to RFC 6962 a binding intent to issue the certificate. Therefore it is persisted in the database (with status 'good' ) in order for OCSP to respond in accordance with Mozilla's policy and CA/B Forum expectations. Revocation of precertificates is handled the same way as real certificates in EJBCA and will be written to the CRL.